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those who live outside Japan had been under challenge in some lawsuits. 
The judgment of the Supreme Court of March 30, 1978 ?32 ?2? MINSHU 
435? decided that those who entered Japan illegally and were present in 
Japan were entitled to the benefits under the Act on Medical Treatment 
etc. of the Atomic Bomb Survivors. Also, the judgement of the Supreme 
Court of November 1 , 2007 ?61 ?8? MINSHU 2733? declared that the 
Ministry’s interpretation that the right to receive health management 
allowance was lost when an atomic bomb survivor left Japan was illegal.
 After these judgements, the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare 
had been providing allowances but denied payment of medical expenses. 
The legality of such a denial was the issue of this case.
 This judgement found that foreign atomic bomb survivors are entitled 
to the payment of medical expenses of general diseases for two reasons. 
One is the textual interpretation, which is that Art. 18 of the Act does not 
require an atomic bomb survivor to have residence in Japan or to be 
present in Japan to be entitled to the payment of medical expenses for 
general diseases. Second is a teleological interpretation, that the denial of 
payment of medical expenses for general diseases if one gets medical 
treatment outside Japan would be contrary to the objective of the Act to 
provide assistance to atomic bomb survivors for the purpose of giving 
relief to them while focusing on their uncommon health conditions. 
 After the judgement, the Ministry revised its Ministry order for the Act 
to designate the place to submit the application, in order to enable the 
payment of the medical expenses of general diseases.
3.?Family Law
Xs v. Japan
Supreme Court G.B., December 16, 2015
Case No. ?O? 1023 of 2014
1401 HANREI TAIMUZU 84
Summary:
 Article 750 of the Civil Code does not violate Articles 13, 14, paragraph 
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1, and 24 of the Constitution ?There are a concurring opinion, opinions and 
a dissenting opinion concerning the constitutionality of Article 24?.
 
Reference: 
 Constitution, Articles 13, 14 ?1?, 24; Civil Code, Article 750
 
Facts:
 In this case, the appellants allege that the provision of Art.750 of the 
Civil Code, which provides that a husband and wife shall adopt the 
surname of the husband or wife in accordance with that which is decided 
at the time of marriage ?hereinafter referred to as “the Provision"?, 
violates the rights protected under Arts.13, 14 ?1?, 24 ?1?, ?2?, etc. of the 
Constitution, and thus claimed for compensation of damages under Art. 1 
?1? of the State Redress Act, on the grounds of the illegality of the 
appellee’s legislative inaction to amend or abolish the Provision. Three of 
five appellants decided to adopt the surname of the husband in the 
registration; however, they have continued to use their original surname in 
practice. Two of the appellants decided to adopt the surname of the 
husband on their marriage and later divorced by agreement, then again 
submitted their marriage with notifications designating no specific 
surname. The notifications were not accepted due to the failure to choose 
the surname. Appellants insisted that they had felt losses of identity, 
consistent credibility and continuity of their professional outcomes due to 
the change of the surnames, and otherwise suffered disadvantages by not 
being legally married to avoid those losses. Appellants originally reasoned 
their claim as that 1? the Provision unreasonably infringes on the 
“freedom from being forced to change one’s surname”, that is guaranteed 
as the right related to personality itself under Art. 13 of the Constitution, 
which comprehensively protects the right to the pursuit of happiness and 
supplementarily guarantees the rights and freedoms which the Arts. 14 
and following provisions do not provide, 2? the Provision prevents the 
appellants from exercising the “freedom to marry” guaranteed as a human 
right under Art. 24 ?1? of the Constitution, where choosing one surname is 
formally required at the time of marriage, and the Provision leads to 
substantial unequality which does not comply with Art. 24 ?2? requiring 
“the essential equality of the sexes” in legislation referring to the fact that 
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more than 96% of married couples have adopted the husband’s surname, 
and 3? the Provision clearly violates ?b? and ?g? of Art. 16 ?1? of the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women ?hereinafter referred to as “CEDAW"?. At final appeal, the 
appellants additionally mentioned 4? the Provision violates Art. 14 ?1? of 
the Constitution which provides equality under the law from the 
perspective of indirect discrimination and disparate impacts where the 
Provision substantially imposes disadvantages arising from the change of a 
surname upon women in most marriages.
 
Opinion:
 The final appeal shall be dismissed.
 Regarding Art. 13 of the Constitution, a name has the social function to 
identify an individual by distinguishing a person from others, while it also 
has functions for individuals as the basis for a person to be respected as an 
individual and as the symbol of his/her personality. In this perspective, a 
person's name should be held to form part of personal rights. However, a 
surname apart from a given-name forms part of the legal system 
concerning marriage and the family. Hence the particulars of the personal 
rights concerning a surname should be defined only by examining related 
legal systems, and should not be given a single constitutional meaning 
without considering those systems. Looking over the provisions 
concerning a surname under the Civil Code, a surname is placed as an 
appellation for a family which is a constituent of society. Since a family is a 
natural and fundamental unit in society, it may be reasonable to determine 
a single surname which represents the unit that an individual belongs to. 
The situation discussed in this case is one where either a husband or wife 
changes his/her surname at marriage with his/her own will, thus neither 
of them could be said to be forced to change his/her surname against his/
her will. On the other hand, considering the function of a surname, 
allowing a person to determine or change one’s surname based solely on 
their own will does not suit the essential nature of a surname. Changes of a 
surname along with a change of a civil status are originally implied in the 
system, thus "freedom from being forced to change one's surname" at the 
time of marriage cannot be regarded as part of the rights guaranteed 
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under the Constitution. Hence the Provision does not violate Art. 13. In 
consideration of the private functions of a surname, however, it cannot be 
denied that there are disadvantages that a person suffers due to the 
change of a surname, specially where the average age of marriage has 
increased. Though it would be excessive to argue that maintaining those 
interests is part of the personal rights guaranteed as constitutional rights, 
it can be regarded as a personal interest that should be taken into account 
when discussing a desirable legal system concerning marriage and the 
family. This aspect shall be examined in the discussion about the scope of 
legislative discretion allowed by Art. 24.
 Regarding Art. 14 ?1? of the Constitution, which should be interpreted 
as prohibiting discriminatory treatment under the law unless such 
treatment is based on reasonable grounds in line with the nature of the 
matter, the Provision leaves the choice of a surname to the consultation 
between the persons who are to marry. Since the Provision does not 
formally prescribe discriminatory treatment based on gender by itself, the 
virtually unequal occurrence which the appellants alleged cannot be 
regarded as the consequence arising directly from the substance of the 
Provision. Hence, the Provision does not violate Art. 14 ?1? of the 
Constitution. However, in regard to the actual situation, a certain attention 
should be paid to whether or not such a tendency is derived from the truly 
free choice of both of the parties in a marriage. It would suit to the purport 
of Art. 14 ?1? of the Constitution to eliminate such an influence to ensure 
substantial equality and this should be taken into account when seeking a 
desirable legal system; thus this aspect shall be concerned in the 
discussion of legislative discretion allowed by Art. 24.
 Art. 24 ?1? of the Constitution stipules at that matters such as whether 
to marry or not, whom and when to marry, should be left to the decision 
made by the parties freely and equally. The Provision stipulates the choice 
of a surname not as a requirement to marry, but as an effect of marriage. 
Even where some persons choose not to marry because of disagreement 
with any particulars of the legal system concerning marriage and the 
family, the Provision cannot be regarded as a direct restriction on 
marriage. The de facto restriction on marriage by the legal system shall be 
concerned in the discussion of the scope of legislative discretion. Art. 24 
?2? leaves it to the Diet's discretion to reasonably legislate specific 
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systems, as well as defines the limits of such discretion with requiring 
appropriate consideration for the dignity of the individual and the essential 
equality of the sexes in conjunction with para. 1. This indicates that Art. 24 
requires the legislature to prevent unreasonable de facto restrictions on 
marriage and to assure substantial gender equality practically, as well as to 
give a certain respect for personal interests which cannot be regarded as 
rights that are directly guaranteed by the Constitution. Given the above, 
where the provision prescribing a legal system concerning marriage and 
family does not violate Arts. 13 and 14 ?1?, the purpose of the legal system 
and the influence that may be derived from adopting the legal system 
should be examined to determine whether the provision is also in 
compliance with Art. 24, with consideration of whether or not the provision 
should inevi tably be deemed to be unreasonable in l ight o f the 
requirement of individual dignity and the essential equality of the sexes 
and be beyond the scope of the Diet's legislative discretion. Examining the 
constitutionality of the Provision from this viewpoint, it is reasonable to 
determine a single appellation for each family since a surname has a 
meaning as an appellation for a family, which is a natural and fundamental 
unit of persons in society. By using the same surname, a husband and wife 
are distinguished from others and publicly indicate that they are members 
of one unit. In particular, as an important effect of marriage, a child born in 
wedlock shall be a legitimate child who is subject to joint parental 
authority exercised by the husband and wife, and it may be meaningful to 
secure a framework wherein such a child uses the same surname as his/
her parents in order to show his/her status as a legitimate child. It may 
also be understandable that the individual would feel that he or she was a 
member of a family unit by using the same surname as her/his family. The 
same surname system does not prohibit people using their pre-marriage 
surname as a by-name, and this can ease the disadvantages arising from 
the change of a surname to some degree. Consequently, the system 
introduced by the Provision cannot be found to be unreasonable in light of 
the requirement under Art. 24, and thus the Provision does not violate Art. 
24.
 Accordingly, the legislative inaction in taking measures to amend or 
abolish the Provision is not assessed as illegal in the context of the 
application of Art. 1 ?1? of the State Redress Act. The other reasons for 
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final appeal are not admissible, since the filed arguments assert only a 
violation of laws and regulations which is not permissible as a reason for 
final appeal under Art. 312 ?1?, ?2? of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Editorial Note: 
 Art. 750 of Civil Code provides that the adoption of one surname shall 
be made by agreement, but more than 96% of married couples have chosen 
to adopt the husband’s surname. Despite of the fact that the Provision is 
placed as an effect of marriage in the Civil Code, this requirement to 
change a surname functions as a condition to establish legal marriage 
since Art. 739 of Civil Code prescribes that marriage comes into effect 
upon written notification pursuant to Art. 74 ?1? of the Family Registration 
Act which requires compulsorily to designate a surname to be adopted in 
the entry. In the Japanese legal system, accordingly, one of the parties in a 
marriage must weigh the relative merits/demerits and choose either being 
married or keeping their original surname, so the appellants in this case 
constructed a concept of “freedom from being forced to change one’s 
surname” at the time of marriage. Considering Art. 13, though the Court 
admitted that a surname had significance for an individual as a symbol of 
one’s personality and thus forms part of personal right, the Court 
explained that particulars of such personal rights could only be grasped in 
the relation of certain specific laws, and the social functions of a surname 
to represent a family unit an individual belongs to and the nature of a 
surname not to allow a person to change one’s surname only by one’s own 
will were found according to existing regulations. Adopting one surname 
at the time of marriage was therefore determined as reasonable, thus the 
Provision was concluded to be constitutional. However, what the 
appellants refer to in this case is a continuous use of their original 
surname, and not to arbitrary choose a surname, and the reasoning 
concerning the nature of a surname mentioned above should be seen as 
not fully justifying the system, especially where the system excludes any 
exception of continuous use of a pre-marriage surname. It could be said 
that continuous use of a pre-marriage surname is rather appropriate to 
ensure to identify a person in a society. Furthermore, it could contradict 
the Court’s opinion referring to Art. 14 ?1? which indicates the existence 
of the intervention of one’s own will in the choice of a surname. As the 
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reasoning from the social functions seemed to be not sufficient, what 
eventually the Court devotedly emphasized was to maintain the surname 
as “an appellation for a family”. 
 To fully understand the function of a surname as an appellation for a 
family, the transition of Japanese Civil Law and the civil registration 
system should be mentioned. In the prewar age, before the amendment in 
1889, the old Civil Code Art. 746 had prescribed that the householder and 
his family shall use the surname of the house ?IE?, and a surname was 
evidently an appellation of a family. In most of the cases under the old Civil 
Code, wives entered the house by their marriage and accordingly adopted 
the appellation of a family, which was the surname of the husband, thus 
such change of a surname was not controversial. The concept of the house 
?IE? is, however, conciously removed from the current Civil Code, which 
even no longer clarifies the concept of a family, but rather prescribes each 
interpersonal relationship, such as a parent-child relationship and a 
relationship between spouses, stipulating rights and obligations between 
those individuals. Accordingly, the function of a surname as an appellation 
of a family may seem to be intentionally excluded from the current Civil 
Code. On the other hand, the Japanese Family Register still symbolically 
holds the “family” unit structure. Though an Individual Number system for 
social security and taxation based on resident registration was introduced 
in January 2016 for administrative purposes, the civil status of each 
Japanese national is still managed on this Family Register, and the registry 
is composed of family units, which namely combine the head of a family 
who is assigned e.g. at the time of marriage based on a chosen surname, 
and his/her spouse and their child?ren? who have the same surname as 
the head. The Family Register Act itself is procedural law and therefore 
does not prescribe the substance of what a family should be; however, this 
family register system still drives a strong normative consciousness as a 
presentation of a family which is authorized officially. If the Court declared 
that the Provision was unconstitutional and thus allowed each spouse to 
choose to continue using their original surname, it certainly would have 
had a big impact on detailed systems related to surnames, such as the 
family registration, but this concern must be charged to legislators. The 
Court should have found a more convincing reason to adhere to the family 
based unit which appears within legal systems by the same surname 
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system, especially as the personal interests of individuals are restricted. 
Because of its equivocal nature, though it is widely found in precedent 
cases, the contents and precise value of the concept of personal rights, and 
also the criteria to recognize a right as part of personal rights guaranteed 
under the Constitution or/and the Civil Code, are still unclear. The Court 
described that personal rights were, unlike so-called inherent rights, 
established along with specific legal systems, and thus should be 
examined whether the existing legal systems were reasonable. It could be 
said that since the Court has avoided examining the significance of a 
personal interest with sticking to systematic discussions, it decreased its 
authority compared to the legislature. In addition, where the Court 
mentioned that there is an intervention by parties’ intention in a change of 
a surname to a certain extent by reasoning that marriage should be formed/ 
avoided at their own will, the Court might have failed to examine whether 
the husband or the wife willingly lost/kept his/her original surname, since 
appellants had alleged their actual either-or situation. No reason was 
mentioned for the prevention of intervention of one’s will to keep their 
original surname.
 Art. 14 ?1? has been interpreted as basically covering, at least as a 
judicial norm, only formal equality by its termination of “equality” since it 
is impossible to prevent actual discrimination by taking a result-oriented 
approach. This case followed this criterion. The precedents accept the 
distinctions if it is for modifying actual unequalities and policy means and 
legislations to accomplish those modifications can be approved as 
reasonable. As cited above, the Court’s opinion does not sufficiently 
pursue the reasonability of legal systems, and the adequacy should be also 
questioned where one of the spouses undeniably loses his/her original 
surname which forms a personal interest, under the name of formal 
equality. Regarding the fact that more than 96% of married couples have 
adopted the husband’s surname, it is said that it should be appropriate to 
regard this fact as being caused by virtual psychological pressure rather 
t h a n a s a n i n c i d e n t a l r e s u l t , a n d i f w e d e e m i t t o b e a r e s i d u a l 
consciousness from the prewar family system, this fact must be 
understood as contradicting the fundamental principles of the Constitution 
which pursue gender equality and abolished the former family system. To 
interpret Art. 14 as incapable to judicially impugn indirect discrimination 
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and disparate impacts, such as shown in this case, could be also 
questioned from the fundamental principles.
 Several theories have deemed Art. 24 a provision to substantiate the 
contents of Art. 13 and Art. 14 into a family sphere and to have no utility to 
be theoretically defined by particular rights which the provision 
guaranteed in itself. Contrarily the Court showed its attitude to understand 
Art. 24 as a clause which had a particular role to define the limits of the 
Diet’s discretion by requiring its reasonable legislation to ensure personal 
interests and substantial gender equality which could not be regarded as 
rights that were directly guaranteed by the Constitution. The Court 
dismissed appellants’ argument that the Provision directly infringed 
freedom to marry guaranteed under Art. 24 by reasoning that the 
Provision stipulates the adoption of one surname as an effect of marriage 
and not as a condition to marry which directly restricted freedom to marry. 
In the Court’s opinion the term “marriage” in Art. 24 was interpreted as a 
representation of the marriage which was already supposed to be 
restricted by subordinate laws and regulations, therefore again the 
appellants’ arguments were not deemed as a direct restriction on the 
human rights guaranteed by the Constitution. Consequently, the question 
was left to an examination of whether the legislature transgressed its 
scope of discretion. To determine the legislation as unconstitutional under 
Art. 24, the Court mentioned that the Provision should be determined to 
be unreasonable in light of the requirements under Art. 24 and be beyond 
the scope of the Diet’s discretion, by examining the purpose of the legal 
system and the influence that may be derived from adopting the legal 
system. This is coherent with a traditional moderate scrutiny criterion, the 
least rigorous criterion to exam constitutionality from a rationality based 
perspective which admits constitutionality when the purpose of the 
legistation and its means are not significantly irrational, and this paved the 
way for the particular use of Art. 24. Enphasizing again the significance of 
the surname system with this screening, the Court let the legislature 
handle a broad authority to make a comprehensive assessment on various 
contents, such as social conditions, national traditions and people’s 
sentiments, and therefore the grave task to protect the personal interests 
of minorities behind those sentiments was left to the legislature, who has 
balked at reconsidering traditional family norms for long time.
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 During the examinations under Art. 24, the Court mentioned there was 
a certain meaning of maintaining a system to grant a child the same 
surname as both his/her parents so to indicate to others his/her 
legitimacy. This may raise a question about the consistency with the 
Court’s precedent cases in 2008 concerning denization and in 2014 
concerning the share in succession which diminished the privilege of a 
legitimate child against a child born out of wedlock ?see the Supreme 
Court, G.B., judgment of June 4, 2008. KAGETSU Vol. 60, No. 9, at 49; the 
Supreme Court, 1st P.B., judgment of July 17, 2014. MINSHU Vol. 63, No. 6, 
at 547?. If the advantage of using the same surname as parents is 
recognized by the Court, it could mean to admit the disadvantages of not 
only a child born out of wedlock, but also a child using a different surname 
from his/her parent on account of divorce, de facto marriage, etc. and it 
should be questioned from the perspective of the interests of the child. In 
recent years, the presumption of legitimacy has been emphasized as the 
most important effect of marriage. However, its importance for the 
interests of the child should be found in expediting the settlement of a 
stable father-child relationship, and the legitimacy shouldn’t be deemed as 
giving a privilege to a legitmate child apart from a child born out of 
wedlock;  a parent is never exempt from his/her responsibility for the 
chi ld by using a di f ferent surname from his/her chi ld, and this 
responsibility should be basically charged on parents regardless of his/her 
marital status. Thus the Court has failed to sufficiently explain the 
relationship between the interests of the child and the system to adopt one 
surname at the time of marriage. Even if there is a systematic reason to 
encourage the adoption of one surname between spouses and a child, a 
more compelling explanation should have been presented for where a 
child using a different surname from a parent is euphemistically left to 
suffer disadvantages. Matters which may be supposed to occur with the 
introduction of a less restrictive system, such as the selection of a child’s 
surname, this should be dealt with by the legislature. 
 Lastly, it should be also mentioned that there was no reference to 
CEDAW in the Court’s opinion. Though initial and previous judgments 
discussed the issues on the convention, the Courts dismissed the 
appellant’s arguments by reasoning they were unappealable. As 
mentioned above, recently the Court has diminished the difference 
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between a child born in wedlock and one born out of wedlock, and 
espec ia l ly in the case o f 2014 , the Court ventured to assess the 
constitutionality of a clause in question from the aspects of comparative 
law and international human rights standards, which had been seen as less 
decisive compared with the rigid criteria of the raditional assessment of 
constitutionality. Since the 2014 decision was supposed to bring reflective 
considerat ions for international standards of human rights and 
comparative law and to improve human rights standards in Japan, the 
Court’s ignorance of the international point of view could be seen as a 
retrogression, or even as arbitrary, as the Court only addressed the 
absence of the discriminatory character of the Provision and thus avoided 
directly opposing international criticism. This Court’s attitude also 
contradicts another Court’s judgement which was made on the same day, 
concerning the period to prohibit remarriage which was imposed only 
upon women, since several remarks were made on comparative law in this 
case ?see the Supreme Court, G.B., judgement of December 16, 2015. 
HANREI TAIMUZU Vol. 1421, at 61?.
 The Court appended that this opinion did not prevent legislation of a 
less restrictive surname system, such as one allowing a married couple to 
use separate surnames if they so choose. On the other hand, such a 
system is still not realized, nevertheless the introduction of it has been 
discussed since 1954 by the legislative council. The Court’s modest 
decision would barely have a suff ic ient inf luence on the Diet to 
spontaneously work on this issue, and here the role of the judiciary, which 
is supposed to be independent f rom the leg is la ture , should be 
reconsidered. Though actually a surname used to be connected with 
joining and leaving a household and a number of legal effects were 
stipulated based on it, according to the opinion by Justice KIUCHI, Art. 24 
of the Constitution was inserted aiming at the abolition of this household 
system, and most of the legal effects, including inheritance of parental 
authority, are separated from a surname today, except for the very venial 
area concerning assumption of rights relating to worship. Accordingly, the 
reason of maintaining the current surname system should be found in 
other than legal effects. The Courts mentioned the sense of unity as a 
family to explain necessity of persisting in the system. However, providing 
exceptions for choosing different surnames will not harm that sense held 
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by who want to gain it by adopting the single surname. It was mentioned 
that the current surname system prevents people who are unwilling to 
change his/her surname marrying. Denial of the sense of unity which the 
latter person wants to realize by legal marriage cannot be justified. In 
addition, the reasonability of legislation to exclude any exception was not 
pursued in this case. Despite the fact that the Court assumed the 
disadvantage from changing a surname could be eased by using a by-
name, use of a by-name has no legal foundation, and thus provides no legal 
certainly. Usability of a by name does not grant reasonability to the 
legislature still avoiding any exception to the system. Moveover, 
international marriage does not lead to adopting a surname, since the 
family register only handles Japanese nationals. The current attitude 
shown by the Court to persist the family norms peculiar to Japanese 
nationals seems to be highly exclusive. This case revealed the Court’s 
attitude to hesitate to mend the family norms which are based on legal 
marriage and the legitimacy of the child, and the approach from the 
respect of the individual in a family unit shown in case 2014 was retreated. 
Though there is no clear statement of why the court should have avoided 
intervening in the traditional family norms, a risk of a persisting 
“normative” family structure, which could entrap people out of this 
structure as deviant and blindly bury individuals into the collectivity of a 
family, must be recognized.
4.?Law of Civil Procedure and Bankruptcy
X v. Y
Supreme Court 1st P.B., November 30, 2015
Case No. ?ju? No.2146 of 2014
69 ?7? MINSHU 392
Summary:
 In a case where the first instance makes a judgment that a litigation 
had been closed upon the Settlement having been reached and only the 
defendant filed an appeal against the judgment, while the plaintiff filed 
